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VOLUME XX APRIL, 1936 NUMBER THREE
DEFECTS IN TITLES TO REAL ESTATE
AND THE REMEDIES
CLAuDE J. HENDRICKS
N THE necessary limits of a discussion such as this, only a few of
the high spots can be touched, and those only in a very brief and
sketchy manner, although the importance of the subject warrants a
most painstaking study of the questions which arise daily in the exam-
ination of titles. With the lapse of time and with all of the improve-
ments and the greater knowledge and education of the persons who
draft conveyances and make abstracts and examine the same, the prob-
lems instead of becoming more simple are becoming more complex.
The objections now made to titles as disclosed in abstracts were
almost unheard of twenty-five or thirty years ago. Scarcely a day
passes that some unheard of and previously unimagined objection to
an abstract or a title is not voiced by some examiner, so that the exam-
iner is constantly faced with a heavy responsibility in approving a title
because some subsequent examiner may advise a client that the title
is unsatisfactory. The examiner never knows when a title which he
has approved, and which has appeared to him to be a perfectly good
title will be assailed, not by a person who has some interest in the
property, but by some over-zealous or over-timid examiner.
In modem business, real estate has become a comparatively liquid
form of property, and, by the same token, its transfer should have
become more simplified and expedited. A person can nowadays pur-
chase almost any other type of property, regardless of the value, with
less fear and uncertainty than real estate, and without any of the de-
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lays attendant upon transfer of its title. Antiquated and outworn meth-
ods of conveyancing and of examination of titles are still in use and
these serve to impede the transfer of real estate rather than to facili-
tate it. Yet real estate is something that cannot be stolen and moved to
other localities or hidden or be disguised in any manner. The use to
which it is put or the manner in which it is occupied is something that
is open and obvious to any and every person who may be interested in
it. It is one of the principal sources of the income of government by
reason of levying of taxes on it; it is listed in the tax rolls, and if the
taxes are not promptly paid, it is sold to satisfy the lien. The assessors
are required to assess it from actual view, or from the best information
that the assessor can practicably obtain, and as accurately as possible to
list it for assessment in the name of the proper owner. There is no type
of property less susceptible of improper and fraudulent transfer or
fraudulent obtaining of money, and this is true regardless of the
safeguards thrown about its transfer for the protection of owners and
purchasers or mortgagees.
In cities, whether large or small, or villages, and in a large portion
of the State of Wisconsin, real estate has become so valuable and so
improved and cultivated that its ownership and boundaries are well
known to the people of the locality where it is situated, and from this
in conjunction with the modem requirements of recording conveyances
and liens, its ownership is apparent, and in a large majority of cases
its real ownership can be ascertained by almost casual inquiry and
by the most unskilled.
The examiner of the abstract and, through it, of the title should not
forget that he is examining a title rather than an abstract; that his
client wants to know about the title to the real estate rather than the
abstract; that he is employed by his client and is paid for telling the
client whether the title is one that the client can safely purchase with-
out the probability, rather than the possibility, that the title may be
attacked, and that probability one reasonably certain and in the not dis-
tant future. There is no title which may not be attacked by some one
making a perfectly fictitious claim and bringing suit to recover real
estate, and without any reference to the state of the record title.
In this discussion, no attention will be paid to the unusual or excep-
tional defects which may appear, but to those which appear in prac-
tically every abstract. Any consideration of such unusual and excep-
tional defects would be of very little value for present purposes. As the
source of the examiner's information is the abstract which he is exam-
ining, and is the basis of his opinion as to the validity of the title, no
consideration will be given to what might be discovered outside of the
record title as disclosed in the abstract and the necessary implications.
and deductions to be made from the matters shown in the abstract.
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Most of the difficulties connected with the examination of the record
title shown in an abstract arise out of the narrow and technical defini-
tion of marketable title adopted by the courts, which have clung to' the
rules established in early cases when conveyancing was highly techni-
cal and titles uncertain. There has been very little effort on the part of
courts to modernize and liberalize their definitions and practice to
meet modern business conditions and apply them to very different
conditions. Many of the cases, and particularly those which have dealt
with objections to the title which cause examiners the most difficulty,
were cases where a vendor was attempting to force a title upon an
unwilling purchaser who seized upon technical objections to escape
from his contract obligation, and were not cases where someone having
a valid claim to land was attempting to recover it from someone
attempting to justify his title upon the record.
In considering objections to the record title, a distinction must
necessarily be drawn between those which are of long standing, and
which can possibly be claimed to have been cured by lapse of time,
and which by reason of such lapse of time are difficult to meet with
proof of any sort, and those which are of such recent date that they
can either be cured by investigation of readily accessible sources, or if
not explainable, warrant the rejection of the title because of the possi-
bilities of trouble which they suggest. Practically every abstract will
show instruments which have not been witnessed or sealed or have
not been properly acknowledged, or have been executed by a corpora-
tion by one officer only, or without corporate seal, which may safely be
disregarded because of statutory provisions curing such defects.,
Similarly, many criticisms of court proceedings shown in an abstract
may be disregarded.2
1Section 235.20 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) validates instruments un-
acknowledged, or defectively acknowledged, or not properly witnessed or not
sealed, or executed without corporate authority, or which are otherwise defec-
tively executed, after twenty years' record. Section 328.25 provides that every
instrument purporting to have been signed or executed by any person shall be
proof that it was so signed or executed until denied by the oath or affidavit of
such person, or by a pleading duly verified, except where the person shall
have died previous to the requirements of such proof. Section 235.21 validates
defectively signed corporate releases of mortgages on real estate made more
than ten years before the taking effect of said section.
2 Section 316.33 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) provides that when any sale
has been made under order of the county court by an executor or administra-
tor, the title of a purchaser in good faith shall not be invalidated by any
omission or error in the appointment of the executor or administrator, or by
any defect or irregularity in the proceedings except in the manner and for the
causes that the same could be invalidated in case such sale had been made
pursuant to the order of judgment of a court of general jurisdiction. Section
316.45 limits actions to recover land sold by an executor or administrator to
five years next after the sale, and actions to recover land sold by a guardian
to five years next after the termination of the guardianship, excepting that
persons under legal disability to sue at the time when the cause of action
accrues may commence their action within five years next after removal of
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In view of all of these statutory enactments, all of which are clearly
within the power of the legislature to pass, a great mass of irregulari-
ties appearing in probate proceedings, execution sales, partitions and
foreclosure actions, particularly if old, may be disregarded. And the
abstract need only show the necessary facts giving the court jurisdic-
tion to render the judgment, and the notice and confirmation of the
sale, if required, and all other matters may be omitted from the
abstract, and it need not set forth in detail the allegations of com-
plaints, answers, affidavits and other similar matters.
In considering the sufficiency of a record title, and the kind of a
title that a purchaser under a contract is entitled to, much confusion
has arisen by reason of the failure to distinguish between good title,
marketable title, perfect title and record title. In many cases the terms
have been used interchangeably, even in the same opinion. The courts
in many cases have attempted in the application of the law to the par-
ticular case to distinguish between such titles, holding that whether the
purchaser was entitled to ask for a marketable, a good, a perfect, or a
record title depended upon the terms used in the contract of purchase.
However, in this discussion, it will be assumed that the title must
be a marketable one, determinable from the abstract. The Wisconsin
court has defined a marketable title as follows: "As a general rule, a
title which is open to judicial doubt is not marketable; but what may
the disability. Section 316.46 provides that a sale by an executor, administra-
tor or guardian shall not be avoided on account of any irregularity in the
proceedings; provided he was licensed to sell by the county court having
jurisdiction, gave bond if required and approved by the court before sale,
gave notice of sale as prescribed by law. Section 316.49 provides that
a sale by an executor, administrator or guardian shall not be questioned by
any person not claiming from or through the deceased persons or the ward,
on account of any irregularity in the proceedings, if it appears that the exec-
utor, administrator or guardian was licensed to sell by a court having juris-
diction, and that he did accordingly execute and acknowledge, in legal form,
a deed for the conveyance of the premises. Section 318.06 provides that any
finding or determination as to heirship or assignment of real estate in any
judgment of the county court shall be presumptive evidence of any fact so
found and of the right to any portion of the said estate so assigned, and
shall be conclusive evidence thereof as to all persons appearing in any such
proceeding and as to all persons claiming under them. Section 253.21 provides
that when the validity of any order or judgment of a county court shall be
drawn in question in any other action or proceeding, everything necessary to
have been done or proved to render the order or judgment valid, and which
might have been proved by parol at the time of making the order or judgment
and was not required to have been recorded, shall after twenty years from
such time be presumed to have been done or proved, unless the contrary
appears on the same record. Section 328.06 provides that every conveyance
of land by any sheriff, referee, receiver, or other person, pursuant to a sale
under any judgment, order, license or execution of any court of record recorded
in the proper county, as well as such record, shall be received as presumptive
evidence of the facts therein stated, and that the title, which such conveyance
purports to convey, passed to and vested in the grantee therein at the date




be regarded as such doubt is not easily defined, depending much upon
the discretion of the court. But in no case will a purchaser be com-
pelled to accept and pay for a title which he can only acquire in posses-
sion by litigation and judicial decision, nor where it is evident that his
possession must be defended in like manner. He is not bound to buy
a lawsuit. Waterman, Spec. Perf. secs. 411 et seq. Specific performance
will not be decreed at the suit of a vendor whenever the doubt con-
cerning his title is one which can only be settled by further litigation,
or when the court can see that the purchaser will, with reasonable
probability, be exposed to bona fide adverse claims on the part of third
persons. * * * But facts must be known at the time which fairly raise
a reasonable doubt and render the title doubtful, and not merely a pos-
sibility or conjecture that such a state of facts may be developed at
some future time. In Cattell v. Correll, 4 Younge & C. 237, ALDERSON,
B., said in regard to a doubt from a fear of future litigation: There
'must be a reasonable and decent probability of litigation. The doubt
must be reasonable, and, so far as it depends upon contingent events
and uncertain facts, their occurrence and existence must be fairly prob-
able.' " The court held in that case that a title based on a tax deed fair
upon its face was prima facie marketable, and was sufficient under a
contract requiring an abstract showing a perfect title in the vendor.4
Our court has held that under a contract to convey a clear and
indefeasible title, a purchaser could insist upon a marketable title, and
that a title depending upon the statute of limitations was a marketable
one, and said: "After twenty years of peaceable and uninterrupted
adverse possession a grant will be presumed. ' ' 5 In another case the court
3 Gates v. Parmrnley, 93 Wis. 294, 313-314, 66 N.W. 253, 67 N.W. 739 (1896).
4Gates v. Parmley, supra, note 3.5 Nelson v. Jacobs, 99 Wis. 547, 75 N.W. 406 (1898). Cf. Hedderly v. Johnson,
42 Minn. 443, 44 N.W. 527, 18 Am. St. Rep. 521 (1890) from which the court in
Nelson v. Jacobs, supra, quotes as follows (pp. 559-560): "'To make a title
to real estate unmarketable, so that specific performance of a contract to con-
vey will not be enforced against the vendee, there must be a reasonable doubt
as to its validity. If the doubt raises a question of law, it must be a fairly
debatable one,-one upon which the judicial mind would hesitate before decid-
ing it. If the doubt depend on a matter of fact, and there is no doubt as to
how the fact is, and if it may be readily and easily shown at any time, it does
not make the title unmarketable.' In that case Chief Justice Gilfillan, speaking
for the whole court, among other things, said: 'Courts will not compel a
vendee to take an unmarketable title when he has stipulated for a good one;
and a title is deemed unmarketable, within this rule, where, although it may
be good, there is a reasonable doubt as to its validity. The term reasonable
doubt is always used in this connection, because, as a doubt might be sug-
gested or question raised as to most titles, it would go far to do away with
the remedy by specific performance if a mere doubt raised, without regard
to its character, were permitted to defeat the action. A doubt as to the title
may be raised upon a question of law, or upon a question of fact, or upon
both law and fact. It is impossible to state any precise and definite rule by
which to determine when a doubt raised upon a question of law is to be
deemed reasonable. Without going so far as some of the English cases, we can
at least say that the doubt suggested must raise a question of law that is fairly
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has held that under a contract to convey a good record title, adverse
possession of over twenty years did not constitute a title of record.,
In the case of Harrass v. Edwards,7 it appeared that the record did not
show that a recent deed was so executed as to entitle it to record, and
the court said: "The plaintiff, as a purchaser, could not be required to
accept a defective or unmarketable title. He had an undoubted right to
a good title; and, while a title may be good, yet, if there is reasonable
doubt of its validity, the purchaser is not obliged to take it * * *; and
so it follows that a title may be valid, and yet not marketable * * *
A material defect in the title to land is such a defect as will cause
a reasonable doubt and just apprehension in the mind of a reasonably
prudent and intelligent person, acting upon competent legal advice, and
prompt him to refuse to take the deed at a fair value. * * * If a doubt
exists, so as to make it probable that the purchaser's right may be a
matter of legal investigation, or if the title depends upon facts to re-
move it which can only be established by parol evidence should the title
be attacked, he will not, in general, be compelled to complete the pur-
chase. He will not be compelled to buy a lawsuit. * * * The plaintiff
was not bound to take the risk of being able to show that the deed in
question had in fact been so executed as to pass the legal title as
between the other nineteen grantors and the grantee." 8
There are three types of defects in a record title which appear in
practically every abstract examined, that is, variances in names between
grantee and grantor, unreleased or defectively released mortgages, and
deeds in which no wife joins, and it does not appear whether the
grantor was married or single at the time, and while the examiner is
perfectly satisfied in his own mind that such of these as are of long
standing may be safely disregarded, he hesitates to pass them because
of the fear that some subsequent examiner will reject the title.
As to unreleased mortgages or defectively released mortgages, the
doubt arises because of the uncertainty as to whether or not payments
may have been made which have kept the mortgage or debt alive. He is
afraid that some payments may have been made upon the mortgage
debt which have prevented the running of the statute of limitations,
debatable,--one upon which the judicial mind would hesitate before deciding
it. * * * On the other hand, if there is no doubt as to how the fact is, and it
may be readily and easily shown at any time, the title is not rendered doubtful
by depending upon it. Thus, where the title depends on the bar of the statute
of limitations, and it clearly appears that the real owner is barred, it is a
marketable title. Pratt v. Eby, 67 Pa. St. 396. In such case the evidence to
establish it must, from the nature of the fact, be easily accessible.'"
6 Zunker v. Kuehn, 113 Wis. 421, 88 N.W. 605 (1902). Cf. Stack v. Hickey, 151
Wis. 347, 138 N.W. 1011 (1912) and Andrews v. Fluekiger, 168 Wis. 348, 170
N.W. 256 (1919).
7 94 Wis. 459, 69 N.W. 69 (1896). Cf. Cutter v. Green, 185 Wis. 163, 201 N.W.
373 (1924) and Douglass v. Ransom, 205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).8 Harrass v. Edwards, 94 Wis. 459, 463-464, 69 N.W. 69 (1896).
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notwithstanding the fact that a long chain of conveyances appear, in
which no mention whatever is made of the mortgage, and no assump-
tion thereof appears by purchasers through a long period of time.
It would seem to be a fair assumption that where the continuation
of the abstract shows that it was continued at or shortly prior to the
time of a conveyance in which no mention is made of the mortgage,
that the purchaser was satisfied from such investigation as he made
that the mortgage no longer constituted a lien upon the property; other-
wise some mention would have been made of it in the abstract, or he
would have procured a release of it. Apparently, no consideration is
given to the fact which frequently appears that the mortgage covered a
large tract of land, which has afterwards become platted or cut up into
numerous small parcels, and that the land in question is such a small
part of the total area covered by the mortgage that the lien thereof
upon a particular parcel in question would be infinitesimal; that pur-
chasers of other parcels affected by the same mortgage have been satis-
fied that the lien no longer in fact exists; that the original mortgagor
has parted with all interest in the land and can have no further inter-
est in keeping the debt alive; that in a conveyance by the original mort-
gagor, if the mortgage still existed, he would presumably have pro-
tected himself by requiring the purchaser to assume all or a propor-
tionate part of the mortgage; that he has given a warranty deed; that
his grantee and those under whom he claims and whose statements can
be obtained, state that no claim whatever has been made by any one
pretending to claim any rights under the mortgage, and that they have
not paid any interest to any one.
The examiner ignores rules of law which have been established by
various courts: that payment of interest on a mortgage by a mortgagor
after sale of part of the premises does not extend the lien as to prem-
ises sold ;9 that the purchaser of land is protected by the statute of lim-
itations even though the mortgagor as between himself and the mort-
gagee has waived its protection ;1O that the mortgagor cannot by pay-
ment revive a mortgage against purchasers or encumbrancers acquir-
ing title after the bar is complete ;"1 that limitations run in favor of
grantees of part of the land mortgaged who have not assumed any part
thereof, though purchasers of other parts have kept the mortgage
alive.'12
9 Murdock v. Waterrnann, 145 N.Y. 55, 39 N.E. 829, 27 L.R.A. 418 (1895).
10 Wood v. Goodfellow, 43 Cal. 185 (1872).
11 Clark v. Grant, 26 Okla. 398, 109 Pac. 234, 28 L.R.A. (N.s.) 519, Ann. Cas.
1912 B, 505 (1910).
32 Ely v. Wilson, 61 N.J. Eq. 94, 47 Atl. 806 (1900) ; Barger v. Gery, 64 N.J. Eq.
263, 53 Atl. 483 (1902) ; Mack v. Anderson, 165 N.Y. 529, 59 N.E. 289 (1901)
in which the court stated that the mortgagor could have kept the mortgage
alive by payments even after he had conveyed the premises, and cited Hughes
v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 489, 6 L.ed. 142 (1824) a case which was based, appar-
No. 3]
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Some of the cases holding that payment by the mortgagor tolls the
statute depend upon the language of the statute relative to payment,
and in considering such cases Section 330.46 of the Wisconsin Statutes
(1935) should be kept in mind. It provides that nothing con-
tained in Sections 330.42 to 330.45 (which relate to acknowledgments
or new promises, actions against parties jointly liable and as to parties
who need not be joined) shall alter, take away or lessen the effect of
a payment of any principal or interest made by any person, that no
endorsement or memorandum of any such payment, written or made
upon any promissory note, bill of exchange or other writing, by or on
behalf of the party to whom such payment shall be made or purport to
be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of the payment so as to take
the case out of the operation of the provisions of the statute of limi-
tations. And Section 330.47 provides that if there are two or
more joint contractors or joint executors or administrators of any con-
tractor, no one of them shall lose the benefit of the provisions of the
statute of limitations, so as to be chargeable by reason only of any
payment made by any other or others of them.
It would seem that in the absence of something in the abstract
showing the continued existence of the mortgage, the old unreleased
mortgages or mortgages defectively released more than twenty years
previous, where there have been numerous intervening conveyances
without assumption clauses and where it does not appear that the mort-
gages covered other land, might be safely disregarded, were it not for
Douglass v. Ransomt,8 in which the court said: "It has been held that
an unsatisfied mortgage although the lapse of time is such as to make
it probable that the statute of limitations has run against foreclosure
of it, renders a title unmarketable because the running of the statute
may have been tolled by agreement or by payments,' 4 and cites two
cases, one in Nebraska, 15 which does not show how old the mortgage
was, and one in Minnesota,'16 where the mortgage was sixteen years old,
and then says: "This appears to us a reasonable rule and we adopt
it" ; but the court makes no reference to cases holding otherwise, or
in any manner qualifying the rule, or making any attempt to distinguish
them from the case at bar, nor does the court refer to the statute of
limitations in Wisconsin or the statutes relating to the effect of partial
payments.
ently, upon the theory that so long as a mortgagor retains the equity of
redemption or any part of it in the premises sold, his payment extends the
mortgage as against a purchaser who has notice of the existence of the mort-
gage; see also Dubois v. First National Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 Pac. 169 (1908).
"3205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
24Douglass v. Ransom, supra, note 13, p. 447.
15 Rath v. Wilgus, 110 Neb. 810, 195 N.W. 115 (1923).
16 Austin v. Barnum, 52 Minn. 136, 53 N.W. 1132 (1892).
27 Douglass v. Ransom, 205 Wis. 439, 447, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
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As to deeds executed by' a man with whom no wife joins and when
he is not described as single and in which the abstract does not disclose
whether he was a non-resident of Wisconsin or not, either by recital in
the body of the deed or by showing that the acknowledgment was taken
outside of the State of Wisconsin, or subsequent conveyances wherein
he is described as single, there again the lapse of a long period of time
should be very persuasive that there is no outstanding claim of dower,
although such period must necessarily be longer than that affecting
some other types of rights, for the reason that the widow would have
no right to bring suit to recover dower until after the husband's death,
and the statute would not begin to run against her until such date.
The examiner should take into consideration the fact that the
grantee from a husband was doubtless acquainted with him, made due
inquiry as to his marriage state, paid a consideration for the property,
took a warranty deed from him; that the grantor would probably not
have attempted to convey without his wife joining if he had a wife;
that there have been numerous intervening conveyances; that through
a long period of time no claim for dower rights has been made; that if
a wife existed at the date of the deed she would doubtless know of her
husband's conveyance of the land or his ownership of it; that to be
entitled to dower she must have survived her husband and must not
have accepted any testamentary provision made by him for her; that
the property at the time of the conveyance was of small value; and that
if at the time of the conveyance the property was a small unimproved
tract of land, or of little value, the value of the widow's dower, if
afterwards claimed, would be of little value in view of the provisions
of Section 233.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935), which prescribe:
"That when a widow shall be entitled to a dower out of any lands
which shall have been aliened by the husband in his lifetime, and such
lands have been enhanced in value after alienation, such lands shall
be estimated in setting out the widow's dower according to their value
at the time they were so aliened." The examiner should also take into
consideration the fact that the cases are extremely few where after a
long period of time a widow has attempted to claim dower in a hus-
band's land on account of an ancient deed in which she did not join.
In present conveyances the situation is altogether different because
a widow's right of dower has now been changed to one-third in fee of
the lands of which the husband was seized during marriage, instead
of the life use of one-third as was provided by the former law. This,
however, applies only to widows of persons dying after August 31,
1921.
There is nothing in an abstract of title, however, that causes more
headaches to the examiner than variances in names, and particularly
Xo. 3] 1
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since the case of Douglass v. Ransom.18 And there is probably no more
concrete way of discussing the effect of variances in names than by
taking this particular case, which is singularly barren of citations, par-
ticularly Wisconsin cases, that sustain the conclusions arrived at by the
court on variances in names and unreleased or defectively released
mortgages. Such facts as are herein stated are taken from the record
on appeal.
The land in question was a lot in the City of Waukesha, which was
part of a larger tract of land that passed for a considerable period
of time through the same chain of title, many of the objections affecting
the whole of the larger tract. The trial court in its findings said that
there were substantial and valid objections to the title, and such as to
warrant a reasonably prudent and careful man in insisting that they
be removed, either by an action to quiet title, petition and order, or by
affidavit. The first was a contract dated September 14, 1841, recorded
October 25, 1847, to convey on payment of $4,000 in four equal pay-
ments of $1,000 each on September 14, 1842, 1843, 1844, and 1845,
which had never been released and no conveyance had been made
thereunder by the seller to the purchaser. This contract affected the en-
tire east half of the quarter section, and its existence has been appar-
ently disregarded by the examiners of the title to all of the rest of the
land embraced in the half quarter section. The fact that the payments
had matured and that no suit had been brought would seem to answer
the objection. The second was a mortgage assigned in 1850 to the Mil-
waukee and Waukesha Railroad Company, and subsequently assigned
by the Milwaukee and Mississippi Railroad Company and later released.
The above assignments appear on the mortgage itself and the mortgage
was re-recorded to show such assignments. While the abstract did not
show it the fact was that by the Session Laws of 1856 the name had
been changed between the two assignments.
Another finding was that a mortgage to Joseph and Lyndsey Ward
was released by Lyndsey Ward alone, no release appearing from the
said Joseph Ward or assignment by him. The above mortgage affected
the whole of the quarter section. The abstract showed that the mort-
gage was for $4,000, dated September 28, 1841. It does not show more
than one note or one debt and was released on the margin of the
record on November 21, 1857. The court entirely disregarded the rule
that one of joint mortgagors where there is only one debt may release
the mortgage. Another finding was that a release of a mortgage to
Shubal M. Davis was released by J. A. Short, no assignment to Short
appearing. The above release was made in 1855 and recited that the
mortgage was duly assigned by Shubal M. Davis to J. A. Short. This
18205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
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mortgage also covered the larger tract of land, and is apparently the
mortgage referred to by Justice Fowler in Douglass v. Ransom79 as the
one where there is no similarity between the names of the mortgagee
and the party releasing.
Among the objections made by the examiner which he said should
be cleared up, in addition to those already mentioned, were many due
to variances in names, such as assignment of a mortgage to David J.
Power and release by D. J. Power in 1859; a mortgage to Valentine
Erdman released in 1862 by Valentine Ertmann; assignment of a mort-
gage to Jacob L. Bean and release by W. L. Bean and S. A. Bean, the
examiner stating that it appeared by an abstracter's note that Jacob L.
Bean died May 10, 1855, and that letters of administration were issued
to Jane E. Bean, Walker L. Bean, and Sidney A. Bean. It appears by
the abstract that the so-called note to which he referred was an entry
by the abstracter that the records of the probate court of Waukesha
County showed the death of Jacob L. Bean and the appointment of
the executors, and further that at the date of the release on April 12,
1856, they were acting as such. However, the examiner does not men-
tion the fact, as is shown in the abstract, that a mortgage appeared to
Jacob S. Bean, which was released on April 12, 1856, by the said W. L.
Bean and S. A. Bean, as executors.
Another criticism by the examiner was that a deed appeared to
Horatio N. Ward in 1843, and a conveyance in 1846 by H. N. Ward,
but that the abstract did not disclose title in the grantors of Horatio
N. Ward, or whether they were all the heirs of one Josiah Barber.
The said H. N. Ward later conveyed to Charles R. Dakin, and the
examiner apparently overlooked the fact that the abstract showed pro-
ceedings in the estate of Josiah Barber, who died in 1842 and that an
instrument appears in said proceedings dated 1849, by Horatio N.
Ward and wife Harriet E., which stated that they were the son-in-law
and daughter of the deceased, that they were interested in the estate,
and had procured a release or quitclaim deed from the other heirs, and
that the proceedings show that the land in question was sold by the
administrator under order of court to Charles R. Dakin.
In treating variances in names of the character involved in the
Douglass-Ransom case-and most of the cases involving such variances
are of a very similar character-as such defects in the record title as
to make the title unmarketable, the court and the examiner who raises
such objections overlook many facts which it would seem should be
considered, some of which have been heretofore mentioned.
The fact is overlooked that presumably the purchaser before receiv-
ing his deed negotiated with some one whom he was satisfied was the
19 205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
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owner; that the grantor went to some scrivener whom he knew, to
have the deed prepared; that if the deed was executed in the town,
city or village where the land was located, he was also known to the
witnesses; that he executed a warranty deed under his seal in the pres-
ence of witnesses, and acknowledged before some officer, that he exe-
cuted the instrument, and the acknowledging officer certified that the
grantor was known to him and acknowledged the instrument. The fact
is further overlooked that from that time forward no one has ever
questioned the identity of the parties, although repeated continuations
of the abstract are shown, in which the variance is disclosed and the
property has been conveyed or mortgaged many times by warranty deed
with no requirement on the part of a purchaser or mortgagee that
anything be done to explain the variance.
In many cases the character of a variance, if the examiner has
imagination, should tell him that the apparent variance may be due to
error on the part of the recorder in transcribing the document, which
in all of the older conveyances was written in longhand, because of
either poor penmanship on the part of the scrivener or on the part of
the grantor; that many letters when written in longhand are impossible
to distinguish from other letters, as for instance in the case already
cited of the abstract showing a mortgage to Jacob S. Bean, whereas
the estate of Jacob L. Bean is shown. This is undoubtedly due to the
fact that these letters are frequently confused, even today.
In a city such as Milwaukee with a large foreign population, a vast
number of variances which are criticized are due to the fact that either
the grantor is unable to write English well, or is unable to spell his
name correctly in English, or the scrivener when the name is spelled
has not been sufficiently familiar with the foreign language to cor-
rectly spell the names. This may be illustrated by the fact that if you
were asking a German how to spell his name, which contains the letter
"e," he would say "a," as though it were the first letter of the alphabet,
and that is the way it would go into the document.
Another frequent source of criticism is the fact that persons who
have been baptized Friederich, in business become Fred, or Friedrich,
Frederick, Frederic, or Fritz. John, Johann and Hans may be all the
same person. Francis may become Frank, and Henry becomes Harry
or Heinrich. And all of these variances may be cleared up in the
abstract by reference to other instruments, such as mortgages, merely
by the fact that in such instruments a wife of the same name has
joined, or by the name being correctly given in the body of the deed
or the acknowledgment.
While on the face of the record one is technically right in saying
that the abstract does not show identity of parties, and that the title is
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therefore unmarketable, yet as a matter of fact and of common sense,
one is perfectly justified in holding the title marketable.
The court is not consistent or logical in the application of its defini-
tion of a marketable title to such a state of facts, as is indicated by a
reference to the definition in the Ransom case, where the court says
that a material defect is such as will cause a reasonable doubt and
just apprehension in the mind of a reasonably prudent and intelligent
person acting upon competent legal advice and prompt him to refuse to
accept it, that if such doubt exists as to make the title subject to prob-
able attack by legal proceedings, or as said by Justice Pinney in Harrass
v. Edwards,20 that if there is a reasonable doubt as to the valid-
ity of the title, it is not marketable, and other similar definitions by
which the courts have attempted to determine whether a title was
marketable or not. In Douglass v. Ransom2 the court recognized the
difficulty when it said: "The general rule applicable is not difficult of
statement, but it is often not easy to determine whether a particular
defect falls within the rule."
A reference to many of the cases in which variances in names have
been held to make the title unmarketable has not disclosed a single case
in which a former owner has attacked the title because he was not the
-grantor who subsequently conveyed and through which the title has
passed, but there are cases where an unwilling purchaser has sought the
aid of the courts in relieving him from a contract which he regretted,
and the courts have been altogether too willing to assist him, and have
thereby created a confusion which has laid a heavy burden upon own-
ers of real estate.
An old saying is "that the proof of the pudding is in the eating."
Apply the definition in the Ransom case that a material defect is such
as will cause a reasonable doubt and just apprehension in the mind of
a reasonably prudent and intelligent person acting upon competent legal
advice and prompt him to refuse it. The abstract in that case showed at
least 156 entries. The property had been conveyed numberless times
with all of the existing defects appearing in the title and had been
accepted by, so far as the abstract disclosed, reasonably prudent and
intelligent persons acting upon competent legal advice, many of whom
were purchasers at a time when the identity of the parties could have
been readily investigated.
It would certainly seem to be a strange coincidence that a person
with the same initials as the former owner, or with a strikingly similar
name, should have conceived that he owned a piece of property that
some one with a similar name was the actual owner of, or that he
2094 Wis. 459, 69 N.W. 69 (1896).
21205 Wis. 439, 446, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
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should be mistaken in the fact of ownership and make a conveyance.
With nothing in the abstract to warrant an inference of fraud or
collusion other than a variance, one must assume that the grantor in
the deed, if he is not the owner, perpetrated a fraud both upon the
owner by clouding his title and upon the purchaser by selling him some-
thing that the grantor did not own, and this in view of the fact that
such action on the part of the grantor constituted a felony under the
statutes of Wisconsin, which since 1849 have provided that if any per-
son shall falsely and fraudulently represent that he is the owner of
any parcel or tract of land to which he has no title and shall execute
any deed of the same with intent to defraud any person whatever, he
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison. If the grantor in
such deed intended to perpetrate fraud, it would seem that he would
have used the exact name of a record owner, so that his fraud could
not have been so readily discovered.
In the Ransom case, the court did not cite a single authority to jus-
tify the decision on variance in names, although decisions are numer-
ous, and those in which variances in names have been held to warrant
rejection of title have been those where there was such a variance in
the deed that was tendered the purchaser or where the variance was
one of recent origin, while in the case of variances of long standing
the apparent weight of authority is that such variances, particularly
where of the character considered in the Douglass case, do not affect
the marketability of the title.
Of this character is White v. Bates,2 2 where patents were issued to
S. Durley and G. T. Gorham, and deeds appear from Samuel Durley
and Gardner T. Gorham. The court says that unless Gardner T.
Gorham was the identical G. T. Gorham who conveyed the land in
1833, he assumed to convey all of the title when he only held a half
interest in the deed from Durley. This evidence, while not absolutely
conclusive, is in the court's opinion sufficient when considered in con-
nection with the lapse of time since these deeds were made, and the
further fact that neither S. Durley, nor G. T. Gorham, nor any one
claiming adversely by, through or under them, or either of them, had
ever set up any claim of title to the premises since the conveyances
made by Samuel Durley and Gardner T. Gorham, to warrant the con-
clusion that S. Durley and G. T. Gorham were the same identical per-
sons who conveyed.
In Lyman v. Gedney23 a deed appeared to Cushman, Eaton & Co.,
and a deed was made by W. H. Cushman, Seth Eaton and two others,
without any recital or other evidence in the abstract that these persons
22 234 Ill. 276, 84 N.E. 906 (1908).
2S 114 Il. 388, 29 N.E. 282, 55 Am. Rep. 871 (1885).
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constituted the firm. The court said that "there is no necessity, of
which we are aware, that this should be recited in the record," and held
that, from the similarity of the names in both deeds and the fact that
these persons assumed to have an interest to convey in the property,
and that -there was no proof that any one else had ever claimed adverse-
ly to this deed to the grantee, as a member of that firm, the proof that
the conveyance was by the firm should be accepted as sufficient.
In the case of Hollifield v. Landrum24 it appeared that a patent
was issued to Levi Hildebrandt in 1852, and that in 1864 0. L. Hilde-
brandt conveyed. The court said that it might well be presumed in the
absence of opposing proof, that 0. L. Hildebrandt received the con-
veyance in his Christian name and conveyed it signing with his initials,
and cited an earlier case holding that similarity of names is ordinarily
sufficient evidence of the identity of a purchaser in a chain of convey-
ances and in the absence of evidence casting a doubt upon the identity
of a party to a conveyance of land which ought to be held sufficient in
every case, and cited another case where a conveyance was made to
Jane Carroll, with a subsequent conveyance shown from Jane M.
Tarbox and her husband, the deed reciting" that they were the same
person, and it was held sufficient in the absence of opposing proof.
In the case of Woodward v. McCollum26 objection was made to
deeds because they were signed merely with the initials of the grantor
instead of his full Christian name and the court said: "We think the
objection without merit. It appears in each case where the grantor
signed simply by his initials instead of his full Christian name the body
of the deed gives the full Christian name and surname; and not only
this, but the attestation clause recites that the grantor described signs
it, and the notary before whom it was acknowledged certifies that the
persons signing are the grantors named in the deed." The court also
held that a deed by Harry Woodworth was sufficient to convey land of
Henry S. Woodworth.
In Vanderwilt v. Broernzan2 6 one of the parties in probate and parti-
tion proceedings was Homer Wharton, and a deed was made by Homer
-F. Wharton. A deed also appeared in the chain of title to George Prine,
and George S. Prine conveyed. The court said: "No reason for ques-
tioning the identity is shown. It is a matter of common knowledge that
the initial of the second Christian name is frequently omitted, and by
2431 Tex. Civ. App. 187, 71 S.W. 979 (1903).
25 16 N.D. 42, 111 N.W. 623 (1907). Cf. Kane v. Borthwick, 50 Wash. 8, 96 Pac.
516, 18 L.R.A. (N.s.) 486 (1908), where the land was conveyed to Hanah R.
Mason in 1870, and was conveyed by Hannah R. Mason, and where the court
said that the objection that these names did not describe the same person was
technical and frivolous.
26 201 Iowa 1107, 206 N.W. 959 (1926). Cf. Cunningham v. Friendly, 70 Or. 222,
139 Pac. 928 (1914).
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the great weight of authority its omission, in the absence of special
circumstances raising doubt about identity, is immaterial."
In Benjamin v. Savage" a deed was made in 1864 to "Henry N.
Weiming of the city of Cincinnati, county of Hamilton and state of
Ohio," and in 1869 "Henry N. Wenning and Caroline, his wife, of the
city of Cincinnati and state of Ohio," conveyed. More than 50 years
after the record of this deed one claiming through the chain of title
under it contracted to sell. It appeared that many conveyances depended
upon it. No adverse title had been asserted. The vendor was in posses-
sion and delivered possession to the purchaser, and the court held that
the vendee's objection to the title was without merit.
It is true there are cases to the contrary, such as Walters v.
Mitchell,28 where title passed in 1899 to George G. Terschuren, and the
grantor attempted to make another deed to Gerhard F. Terschuren,
reciting that it was made to correct the error in the grantee's name, and
in 1907, a California court held that the variance in names rendered
the title unmarketable, and that the mistake was not corrected by the
second deed. But such cases are contrary to the weight of authority.
A case not involving any variance in names, but which may be of
some interest in this discussion, is that of City Bank v. Plank29. There
it appeared that a deed was made to E. D. Plank, who was then
deceased, and whose estate was then in probate, and the court held
that it was the intention to convey the land to E. S. Plank, as executor
of the will of E. D. Plank.
Another source of difficulty, and a most irritating one to the exam-
iner of titles, is the large number of judgments frequently shown in an
abstract, best illustrated by a very recent one, where the record owner
was Mary Schmidt, and judgments were shown against Mae Schmidt,
alias, H. L. Schmidt and Marie Schmidt, Christ. Schmidt and Marie
Schmidt, Mathew Schmidt, alias, and Mary Schmidt, alias, George
Schmidt, alias, and Mary Schmidt, alias, John Schmidt, alias, and
Mary Schmidt, alias, his wife, Mary Schmitt, alias, Marie Schmitt,
Marie M. Schmitt, and Mrs. Mary Schmitt, Jr., alias.
In view of the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case
of Davis v. Steeps,30 that the docket entry of a judgment against
Edward Davis was not constructive notice of a lien on the real estate
of E. A. Davis or Edward A. Davis, the answer to what to do with
such an abstract is apparently clear. The court held that the statute
27 154 Minn. 159, 191 N.W. 408, 35 A.L.R. 97 (1923).
2 6 Cal. App. 410, 92 Pac. 315 (1907). Cf. Peckham v. Stewart, 97 Cal. 147, 31
Pac. 928 (1893), where the record title was in K. F. Redmond, and the deed
tendered the purchaser was signed by K. F. Redman, and the court held that
the variance warranted the purchaser's rejecting the deed.
29141 Wis. 653, 124 N.W. 1000, 18 Ann. Cas. 869, 135 Am. St. Rep. 62 (1910).
30 87 Wis. 472, 58 N.W. 769, 23 L.R.A. 818, 41 Am. St. Rep. 51 (1894).
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relative to docketing judgments requires the clerk to enter in the judg-
ment docket, among other things, the name at length of each judgment
debtor, with his place of abode, title and trade or profession, if any
such be stated in the record, as it is only through the medium of a
sufficient and legal docket of the judgment that it can become a lien on
the real estate of the judgment debtor, and it is the duty of the judg-
ment creditor to see to it if he would secure such lien that his judgment
is properly docketed, for as against a bona fide purchaser for value
any material defect or omission in that respect is the fault of the judg-
ment creditor, and the loss, if any, occasioned thereby will be regarded
as his own. The court said: "It is true that the common law as a general
rule recognizes but one Christian name, and hence for most purposes
the middle name or names, or the middle initial, letter, or letters, of a
person's name are not material * * * in civil * * * proceedings and a vari-
ance in this respect is generally held to be immaterial. The omission or
insertion of, or even a mistake in a person's middle name or initial in
a conveyance is, as between the parties thereto unimportant, and there
can be no doubt but the judgment in this case as between the parties
is a valid judgment against E. A. Davis or Edward A. Davis, by which-
ever name he may be known or called." 31
While we know what is the trouble with the patient, the question
of the remedy is not so easy, but it is one in the discovery of which
examiners of title should be most interested, and should work together
to find. Many schemes have been devised, some of them very elaborate,
and strenuous efforts have been made to make them effective. One
much talked about is the Torrens system of title registration, devised
by a man named Torrens, and which is in operation in a number of
the states and also in Canada. There has been proposed a uniform land
registration act, based upon the Torrens system, and embodying, at
least in substance, the important features of the Acts in use, which will
be used for the purposes of this discussion, but the important provi-
sions, rather than matters of detail will be considered.
This plan states its purpose to be for the certain, cheaper and more
speedy settlement, registration, transfer and assurance of titles to
land, having the following purposes, in detail: to establish or designate
courts of land registration; to provide for the appointment and duties
of registrars of title; to regulate proceedings; to obtain registration of
title; to authorize the adjudication of title; to prescribe the nature of
certificates of title; to provide for the registration of subsequent deal-
ings with registered titles; to regulate sundry proceedings after regis-
tration of title; to determine the legal effects of registration of title; to
establish an assurance fund, and to regulate the fees for registration
31 Davis v. Steeps, supra, note 30, p. 475-476.
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of titles. It provides that the proceedings shall be in rem against
the land, the decree of the court and registered transaction to operate
directly on the land and quiet and establish title thereto in accordance
with the provisions of the plan; it provides for an examiner of title who
makes an examination of the title and reports to the court as a pre-
requisite to the hearing and adjudication of the court; it requires a suit
for the registration to be begun by a petition to the court; it provides
for notice to all persons shown in the examiner's report to be interested
and to whom it may concern, such notice to be personally served when
possible and by publication; it provides for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for all persons under disability, not in being, unascer-
tained, unknown, or out of the state, who may have or appear to have
an interest in or claim against the land; it provides for the entry of a
decree of confirmation and registration which shall bind the land and
quiet the title thereto, which shall be forever binding and conclusive
upon all persons and shall not be attacked or opened or set aside, except
as provided in the plan, and it provides for rehearings and appeals.
The decree is then copied in the office of the Registrar of Titles
and becomes the original certificate of title, a duplicate is issued to the
owner, and transfers are made by deed, and on exhibit to the Registrar,
a new certificate issued. The land remains forever registered, subject
to provisions of the act and amendments thereof, and no title in
derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescrip-
tion or adverse possession. The plan requires the payment of one-tenth
of one per cent of the assessed value of the land to be held by the state
as an insurance fund out of which persons losing any interest or title
by the registration shall recover their damages. The plan only affects
such municipalities as may adopt it and only such land as the owner
may petition to have registered.
While the Torrens or some similar system of title registration has
been adopted by a number of states, and under local option provision
has been adopted in some counties containing large cities, it has not
proven particularly attractive and except in a few localities has been
used very little. While such a system of registration is effective for
disposing of all of the objections to title and the delays incident to the
present methods of title examination and transfer after the registration,
it does not furnish an immediate solution of the problem.
In the first place, no person who is satisfied with his title is going
to spend a considerable sum of money to have his title registered, when
he has no immediate intention of conveying it and particularly when he
has no assurance that the unknown prospective purchaser is going to be
willing to accept a registered title. If he has a sale immediately pending,
the purchaser although willing to accept a registered title may be unwill-
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ing to wait until such registration has become effective after the lapse of
the necessary period during which an appeal may be taken or a review
had. The registration being voluntary, it is impossible to foresee the
time when all titles would be registered, making possible the passing of
any title by the simple process of executing a deed or a contract, and
enabling the purchaser to satisfy himself that he is obtaining a per-
fectly good title, by merely examining the certificate in the registrar's
office.
Another method of escape from the present unsatisfactory situation
is title insurance or title guaranty policies. These do not depend at all
on any statutes, except the protection afforded by the legislative
requirements as to solvency of the insurer, generally by the deposit
of certain securities required at all times to be of a certain value with
some state officer. Such policies are entirely a matter of contract be-
tween the insurer and the insured, and the extent of the obligation
assumed by the insurer is fixed by the type of policy issued. It may be
a mortgagee policy, which only binds the insurer to the amount of
liability under the mortgage. It may be an owner policy, which insures
such owner against all defects in the title, or it may insure the owner,
except as to certain items noted in the policy. A limited policy or one
containing exceptions may be acceptable to a purchaser, and it may not.
If it is an absolute insurance without any exceptions the title is ordi-
narily so good that, except for the insistence of a purchaser upon such
policy, it is wholly unnecessary. It is, however, if a policy can be
obtained which a purchaser is willing to accept, a very satisfactory and
generally an economical method of getting away from objections to the
title in the instant case. However, the purchaser, unless he has pro-
tected himself in his contract with a subsequent purchaser, may find
that the title policy is not acceptable to such purchaser, and further
delay and cost may be found necessary to satisfy such a purchaser.
Again, it takes time to obtain such a policy, as it is necessary to fur-
nish an insurer an abstract of title for examination, and frequently the
correction of objections to the title, before the insurer will issue a
policy. Again, upon transfer of the insurance policy, a further fee is
generally required. In a few places where title insurance has been used
for a considerable period of time, with the experienced purchasers of
mortgagees, such policies have been found very satisfactory, and the
title passes about as readily from hand to hand as does the title to per-
sonal property. Such a situation, however, is the result only of years
of education, and of satisfactory experience with the system. It is,
however, only rarely that a property owner is going to go to the
expense of a title insurance policy until objection is made to his title
by some purchaser who can only be satisfied or who is willing to accept
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such a policy, and the owner finds that the purchase of such policy is
the cheapest and quickest way to bring about the consummation of the
sale.
As in the use of the Torrens system, title insurance affects only
the title to the particular piece of property insured and does absolutely
nothing to improve the titles of other properties, and a very large per-
centage of it is either of insufficient value to warrant the expense, or
the owner cannot afford such expense.
In connection with properties of small value, the title insurance or
title guaranty policy is preferable to the Torrens system of registration,
because the insurance fee is based upon the value of the property, and
frequently the actual cost of the initial policy to the insurer in making
its examination and satisfying itself that it can safely issue a policy is
far in excess of the premium it receives, while registration of a title
under the Torrens Act initially is practically the same regardless of the
value of the property, except as to the small fee paid into the insurance
fund.
Another manner of remedying defective or objectionable titles is by
legislative enactments, and the legislatures of the various states have
endeavored to provide various types of proceedings for that purpose.
In Wisconsin, the statutes provide for an action to quiet title by
any person having a legal title to land, against any other person setting
up a claim thereto,3 2 and for such an action, by any person who has
been in the uninterrupted adverse possession of any real estate for the
period of ten years or more under a conveyance in writing recorded in
the office of the register of deeds, or who has been in such possession
for twenty years or more otherwise than under such conveyance.33
In the first type of action, a person may be made a party by fictitious
name or as an unknown owner, debtor, grantee, representative, or other
like designation; in the second type of such actions, the plaintiff may
make all persons deemed to be connected with or involved with defects
in the title defendants by name, if known, and otherwise generally all
persons whom it may concern by that specification, the summons in the
latter type to be served on all persons specially named as defendants
as in other cases, and on all others by publication, an order for such
publication being obtained after the manner provided by the statutes in
other cases so far as practicable. The judgment when recorded in the
office of the register of deeds on such record shall be conclusive evi-
dence of the status of the title to the lands according to the facts
therein adjudged, and as to all persons not appearing and contesting,
judgment may be rendered without other proof than the verified com-
32 WIs. STAT. (1935) § 281.01.
3 3 Wxs. STAT. (1935) §281.02.
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plaint, proof of service of the summons and the facts as to possession
as alleged.
These statutory proceedings are, just as the Torrens system or title
insurance, of some expense to the property owner, and may or may not
satisfy a, subsequent purchaser, because of the uncertainty as to
whether all persons have been barred by the judgment where they
have been designated only as unknown and have been served only by
publication. Except as to the formalities of service by publication on
unknown owners or claimants, such a proceeding as to them is prac-
tically no more than an affidavit setting forth the necessary facts to
constitute adverse possession, as the plaintiff is not subjected to any
contest or cross-examination and in common practice the judgment is
entered upon the verified complaint, with very little testimony except
as to possession.
These proceedings while frequently used would seem a good deal
like drawing a red herring over a trail, for they only serve to satisfy
the requirement of a title on the record, and then not until after the
lapse of the time within which the judgment may be vacated, for until
then they do not create a marketable title.34
A judgment quieting title is subject to Section 269.46 of the Wis-
consin Statutes empowering the court at any time within one year
after notice thereof to relieve a party from a judgment obtained against
him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,
and Section 269.47, providing that when the summons is served by
publication and is not received by defendant through the postoffice, he
may, upon good cause shown, be allowed to defend after final judg-
ment within one year after actual notice thereof and within three years
after its rendition. The court in Kingsley v. Steiger 5 held that under
the first section any defendant may invoke the discretion of the
court to relieve him from a judgment at any time within one year after
he has received notice thereof without regard to the time the judgment
was rendered, while under the second section, a defendant may demand
such relief as a right, if he does so within one year after notice of the
judgment and within three years after its rendition.
In the Ransom case the trial court in holding that a proceeding to
quiet the title was necessary to render the title merchantable, and the
Wisconsin court in sustaining such holding because of defectively satis-
fied mortgages and variances in names, apparently gave no considera-
tion to the statutes last above mentioned or to the cases above cited
relating to the effect of such statutes on judgments quieting titles.
34 Dalton v. Lybarger, 152 Ark. 192, 237 S.W. 694 (1922); Ewing v. Prnnter,
308 Ill. 585, 140 N.E. 42 (1923) ; Wurfel v. Bockler, 106 Or. 579, 210 Pac. 213(1922) ; Middleton v. Moore, 289 S.W. 1045 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).35 141 Wis. 447, 123 N.W. 635, 31 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1068 (1910).
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The legislature of Wisconsin has provided for the filing of affidavits
setting forth certain facts, which affidavits when of record for twenty
years shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated.3 6 Such affidavits,
however, may not be satisfactory to the title examiner. Recently such
an affidavit, showing that the grantee with a certain middle initial was
the same person who conveyed with a different middle initial, was
objected to because made by the party himself, and such examiner
insisted upon a new affidavit being made by some one not interested
in the property, although the statute does not specify who shall make
such an affidavit. Therefore, such affidavits are unsatisfactory means of
clearing up the matters mentioned in the statute because they afford no
assurance against subsequent questioning by the examiner.
As to unreleased or defectively released mortgages, the legislature
of Wisconsin provides for an order of court discharging the mortgage
of record on proof being made to the satisfaction of the court that it
has been paid or satisfied and that the mortgagee is a defunct corpora-
tion, or is a non-resident of the county, or is deceased, and if he is
deceased that there is no local qualified administrator of his estate,
the record of such order or certified copy thereof to have the
same effect as the record of a discharge by mortgagee duly executed
and acknowledged. 7
What evidence can be offered by the present owner of property
subject to an unreleased mortgage executed originally in 1850? In the
vast majority of cases, all the evidence that he does actually offer as
a basis for the court order is his verified petition or his unsupported
testimony that during his ownership, if he has been in possession for
twenty years or more, or if less, possibly the affidavit or testimony of
his predecessor in title, that he has made no payment on the mortgage.
How does this meet the decision of the Wisconsin court that the statute
of limitations may have been tolled by the payments by somebody else
upon the mortgage debt?
The affidavit of identity, etc., and an order releasing the mortgage
resorted to, only serve to satisfy to some extent the requirement of a
title on the record, and as far as cutting off rights of action are farcical.
In the last analysis, the title is made good only by the operation and
effect of statutes of limitation. The same objection can be made to the
efficacy of suits to quiet title and orders releasing mortgages as effec-
tively disposing of ancient clouds as can be made to the Torrens regis-
tration system and title insurance; such remedies affect only a partic-
ular piece of property, and leave these questions open as to all other
properties affected in a similar manner.
3sWis. STAT. (1935) § 235.46.
37 Wis. STAT. (1935) § 235.60.
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The effect of the decision of the court in the Ransom case is to lay
the burden upon the owner of practically every piece of property in
the State of Wisconsin to bring a suit to quiet title in order to make
the title marketable, as there are comparatively few titles in which
variances in names or unreleased or defectively released mortgages do
not appear. In considering remedies for the condition created by
that important decision, the remedy or remedies sought should be
such as to cure speedily and cheaply the type of defects which exist
in practically all record titles, so that when an owner attempts to sell
or mortgage, such defects will no longer arise to create expense and
delay and possibly prevent a sale.
The present statutory provisions with respect to judgment liens
might well be repealed. A new statutory scheme could provide that no
judgment should become a lien on any real estate of the judgment
debtor until notice of levy be filed in the office of the register of deeds
where the land is located, a notice of levy describing the particular
lands of the judgment debtor. The twenty year period of lien is too
long. It might well be limited to ten or even five years after levy.
Such a change would eliminate the great trouble in Milwaukee
created by the similarity of names of a large number of people in the
city, against whom judgments are frequently docketed. Under the pres-
ent statute, judgments are being obtained daily in Wisconsin, not with
any hope or expectation of the immediate collection of the same or for
the purpose of making such judgments a lien upon real estate known to
be owned by a judgment debtor, but upon the gamble that some time
within ten years the debtor may own a piece of real estate, which upon
the probable average of transfers will be conveyed, and the judgment
creditor without any effort upon his part or the exercise of any dili-
gence whatever, will be able to collect because the debtor finds it
impossible to convey or mortgage without the satisfaction of the judg-
ment. The effect of this practice is to place an unjust burden on many
property owners of the same name.
As to the clouding of the title by unreleased or defectively released
mortgages, a very simple and effective remedy would be to require
every mortgage to state in the body of it the date of maturity, and
then have a statute of limitations limiting the action for foreclosure to
a defined number of years after maturity of the last installment as the
same appears of record, and making the bar absolute in favor of the
purchasers who have not assumed the mortgage. The statutes of Colo-
rado limit such action to seven years from the date of such maturity.
The difficulties created by deeds in which no wife of the grantor
joins and in which he is not described as single, and his place of resi-
dence is not shown, can be readily removed by abolishing dower, as
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many of the states have done, or by allowing it only in lands owned
by the husband at his death. Dower is purely statutory, and as to
inchoate dower, it can be abolished at any time without violating any
legal right."'
A quick inexpensive method of curing old defects of title, such as
have been discussed, is a new statute providing that enumerated defects
shall not affect the title of the present owner, and giving all persons
interested a limited period, at the outside two years, within which to
bring suit, or be barred.
Section 330.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) provides that upon
entry into possession of land under claim of title founded upon some
written instrument as a conveyance or upon the judgment of a court
followed by continual occupation and possession for ten years, the
premises shall be deemed to have been held adversely. Section 330.07
defines adverse possession founded upon a written instrument, Section
330.09 defines adverse possession where one is not claiming under a
written title, and Section 330.10 provides that an adverse possession
of ten years under Sections 330.06 and 330.07, or of twenty years
under Section 330.09 shall constitute a bar to an action for the recovery
of such real estate so held adversely, or of the possession thereof.
Unfortunately, the rights under these sections are limited by Section
330.14, saving rights of action in case disability exists, such as minority,
insanity, imprisonment or absence from the state, evidence of which
appears infrequently in the abstract and in a large number of cases in
connection with those defects cannot be readily discovered.
That the state legislature has power to pass statutes of limitation
is unquestioned.39 In Terry v. Anderson0 the Supreme Court held that
an enactment reducing the time prescribed by the statute of limitation
in force when the right of action accrued is not unconstitutional pro-
vided a reasonable time be given for the commencement of a suit before
the bar takes effect. And in Koshkonong v. Burton41 the Court held that
the legislature of Wisconsin had the constitutional power to provide
3 SBennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N.W. 222 (1881). The court said in that
case (p. 258), "It would seem to follow from the weight of authority, that
while the right of dower remains incohoate-a mere expectancy-and until it
becomes consummated by the husband's death, it is entirely under the legisla-
tive control."39 M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L.ed. 177 (1839). In that case the Court
said (p. 327), "Prescription is a thing of policy growing out of the experience
of its necessity; and the time after which suits or actions shall be barred, has
been, from a remote antiquity, fixed by every nation, in virtue of that sov-
erignty by which it exercises its legislation for all persons and property within
its jurisdiction. This being the foundation of the right to pass statutes of pre-
scription or limitation, may not our states under our system exercise this right
in virtue of their sovereignty?"
4095 U.S. 628, 24 L.ed. 365 (1877).
41 104 U.S. 668, 26 L.ed. 886 (1881).
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that existing causes of action should be barred, unless suits to enforce
them be brought within a shorter time than that prescribed when they
arose, if a reasonable time were given by the new law before the bar
should take effect. This rule of law is thoroughly established, and there-
fore the legislature can as to all existing causes of action shorten the
present periods of limitation, and make the effect of the bar as absolute
as it desires, provided only that it saves to all persons the right to start
their suits within a reasonable time under the circumstances.42
As to whether rights of persons under disability are safe from the
operation of the statute of limitations it depends entirely upon whether
the legislature so prescribes. In Bank of Alabama v. Dalton s the
Supreme Court of the United States held that where the legislature
has made no exception in a statute of limitation, the court can make
none.
The Wisconsin court in Boyd v. Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc."
held that the question of exceptions from the statute of limitations is
a consideration of policy, with which the legislature can deal freely,
and that, where neither the statute nor the precedents of the court
warrant exception from the protection of the limitation statutes, the
court may not with propriety take from them that protection which the
statute by its terms gives.
A statute was enacted in Iowa in 1906 which provided that in case
a husband or wife failed to join in a deed, such husband or wife, or
their heirs, devisees, grantees or assigns, should be barred from recov-
ery unless suit was brought within one year after the taking effect of
the act, and in case the right of action had not accrued by the death
of the party making the deed, then the one not joining was author-
ized to file a notice in the register's office with an affidavit setting forth
the affiant's claim, together with the facts upon which the claim was
based, and if such notice was not filed within two years of the taking
effect of the act, the claim was forever barred. No exception was pro-
42 Cole v. Van Ostrand, 131 Wis. 454, 110 N.W. 884 (1907). In that case the court
said (p. 466), "Until a statute of limitation has completely run so as to vest
title by excluding the possibility of attack thereon, the period of limitation is
wholly within the province of a state legislature, and is not controlled by the
federal provisions against either the impairment of the obligations of contract
or the deprivation of property without due process of law, provided, of course,
a reasonable time be allowed after the new enactment for bringing actions if
the time be shortened."
439 How. 522, 13 L.ed. 242 (1850).
44116 Wis. 155, 90 N.W. 1086, 94 N.W. 171, 61 L.R.A. 918 (1903). Cf. Vance v.
Vance, 108 U.S. 514, 2 Sup. Ct. 854, 27 L.ed. 808 (1883), in which it was argued
that because the plaintiff in error was a minor when the law went into opera-
tion it could not affect her rights, but where the Court said (p. 521) : "The
Constitution of the United States to which appeal is made in this case gives to
minors no special rights beyond others, and it was within the legislative com-
petency of the State of Louisiana to make exceptions in their favor or not."
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vided as to persons under disability, and in Collier v. Smalt 45 the
Iowa court held that the period of one year was not unreasonable.
Another effective method and one entailing no expense to the prop-
erty owner would be to shorten the statutes of limitation relative to
actions to recover real estate, making the bar of such statute absolute
after the period limited, provided it appeared of record that the person
claiming the title under a written instrument during the period of
limitation, or his predecessors in title, had paid taxes, and to require
that the various treasurers of municipalities collecting taxes make the
receipt to show the name of the person paying, or the name of the per-
son in whose behalf the payment was made and to require on every
transfer the payment of a small tax on the value of the land to be paid
to the state treasurer as an assurance fund, and provide that any person
who might be deprived of any estate or interest in the land, and who
would be without remedy because of the statute of limitations might
within a short period next after the time at which his right to bring
action had first accrued, bring an action against the treasurer of the
state for the recovery of such fund and any damages to which he
might be entitled by reason of such deprivation.
The present statute of limitations of twenty years necessary to con-
fer an adverse title under modem conditions is entirely too long, un-
warranted and unnecessary. Twenty years was the period of limitation
fixed in many of the colonial charters. It requires no argument to dem-
onstrate that if twenty years was regarded as necessary and proper
under the conditions then existing, that a much shorter period will serve
the same purpose now, and many of the states have recognized this by
prescribing a shorter period.
45 149 Iowa 230, 128 N.W. 396, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, (1910). Cf. Steinberg v. Salz-
man, 139 Wis. 118, 120 N.W. 1005 (1909), where the court in construing what
are now our ten and twenty year statutes relative to adverse possession said
(p. 123) : "The statutes cited, in terms, make no exceptions in favor of minors
or those under guardianship, or to meet cases of fraud, and they have been
strictly construed in a long line of decisions in this.court. Given a written
instrument purporting to convey a colorable title, and adverse possession there-
under for a period of ten years, the requirements of the statutes are satisfied.
Section 4218, STATS. (1898), does not aid the plaintiffs, as no action was com-
menced within the time limited by that section."
